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ABSTRACT PAGE
Voters in the 2008 presidential election between John McCain and Barack Obama were 
assessed at 3 time-points to ascertain pre- and post-election attitudes. Voters were 
categorized by their initial belief strength and for whom they voted. When comparing the 
favorability of the political parties and candidates, a pattern consistent with choice-based 
dissonance was found for voters with weak initial beliefs, who polarized their assessments 
of the parties and candidates post-election. Voters with strong initial beliefs followed an 
outcome-based dissonance pattern across time for candidate favorability, but experienced 
little change in their opinions of the political parties. Opinions of electoral fairness indicated 
that Obama voters increased their perceptions of overall fairness, whereas McCain voters 
did not change their opinions. In support of outcome-based dissonance, however, McCain 
voters decreased their views on how much their vote made a difference, whereas Obama 
voters increased their opinions. Although Vote Choice was an important factor, Belief 
Strength did not seem to be a dominant factor for attitudes about electoral fairness. For 
public opinion questions, voters with strong beliefs tended to have more extreme changes 
in attitude, though the direction was similar across the levels Belief Strength. Overall, 
differences in Belief Strength varied the type and degree of dissonance voters 
experienced, and affected their pattern of attitude change across time.
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The 2008 Election: Prior Belief Strength, Cognitive Dissonance, and Voter Reactions 
The ability of voters to accept the electoral defeat of one’s party is a necessity for 
any robust democratic system (Ginsberg & Weissberg, 1978). Political and psychological 
research attempting to understand voters and their decisions has focused on election 
outcomes and voter preferences, but this research often neglects the individual voter’s 
psychological responses. Although it is important to understand why voters make their 
final decisions on election day, it is also important to understand what effects the 
electoral process may have on voters. Some research concerning voter reactions to the 
elections has included a psychological approach and has examined either voter behaviors 
or voter attitudes.
Reactions to Competitions
Researchers studying reactions to athletic victories (Cialdini et al., 1976) found 
that victories elicit tendencies for university students to “bask in reflected glory” (BIRG) 
by wearing school affiliated clothing or colors the day after a football victory. They 
concluded that sports fans become personally invested in the successes and failures of a 
team, despite their lack of involvement in a team victory or loss. On the other hand, in an 
examination of how people deal with affiliated losses, Snyder, Lassegard, and Ford, 
(1986) discussed how individuals tend to disassociate themselves from losses by “cutting 
off reflected failure” (CORF).
BIRG and CORF have been studied in a political context where researchers took 
note of those displaying political yard signs before and after an election, but failed to find 
any significant effects (Sigelman, 1986). Sigelman concluded that because the election 
was extremely close and neither candidate was expected to win, post-election emotions
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were not strong enough to elicit CORF. Furthermore, Sigelman posited that only 
unexpected results would cause CORF. Another study which replicated Sigelman’s 
method of tracking political posters found clear effects that support BIRG/CORF, but the 
researchers suggest that BIRG and CORF probably do not represent a singular, 
underlying phenomenon (Boen et al., 2002).
Unfortunately, the majority of this research has focused on voters’ post-election 
behaviors, and actual attitudes were not measured. The similarities between sports fans 
and voters may be limited because, among other reasons, politicians cannot be elected 
without votes, whereas a sports team can, presumably, win a game without fans.
Although BIRG and CORF serve their purposes in understanding sports fans’ reactions to 
wins or losses, researchers interested in examining voter reactions to elections have 
focused on an earlier concept in psychology, that of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957).
Cognitive Dissonance and Attitude Change
Many researchers have used the familiar concept of cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957) as explanation for how attitudes change over time in an election cycle. 
Cognitive dissonance is caused when someone simultaneously holds a thought that is 
contradicted by either a behavior or new cognition, which then creates psychological 
tension. Festinger proposed that individuals attempt to alleviate this tension to reduce this 
dissonance, and although there are many different methods of tension reduction, the 
method most relevant to the research at hand involves changing the attitude. Dissonance 
has also been produced when an initial belief is contradicted by new information, which 
can cause the initial attitude to change (Brehm & Cohen, 1962). Brehm (1956) found that
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when participants were presented with a choice between two objects, their post-decision 
assessment of the objects resulted in a spreading of the alternatives, where the choice is 
viewed more favorably, and the discarded option is viewed more negatively (supported 
by Festinger, 1964; Shultz, Leveille, & Lepper, 1999).
One of the prominent explanations of how cognitive dissonance might be created 
by an election is through choice-based dissonance. This research has found that voters 
increased the differences between the candidates, post-vote, in an effort to reinforce their 
decision, by spreading the alternatives (Frenkel & Doob, 1976). For instance, when 
voters have been asked, directly before and after voting, about the probability of their 
candidate winning, simply having committed their choice to a candidate made voters 
think their candidate had better chances of winning, and supported the concept of choice- 
based dissonance (Regan & Kilduff, 1988).
The second prominent explanation of how cognitive dissonance might be created 
by an election is through outcome-based dissonance (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 
1964; Granberg & Nanneman, 1986), which is when voters change their attitudes toward 
the candidate based on the outcome of the election, specifically whether their candidate 
won or lost. In the event that an outcome presents new information (outcome-based 
dissonance) it was argued that supporters of the losing candidate seek to depolarize the 
choice between the candidates retroactively, in an effort to make the previous options 
seem more similar (Bass & Thomas, 1980). Outside of candidate comparisons, outcome- 
based dissonance can also produce attitude adjustments because the outcome of the 
election provides new information which can either agree with an initial belief, or 
contradict it (Brehm & Cohen, 1962). For example, if a voter believed the media was
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biased against their candidate and that this bias can alter other voters’ opinions, 
dissonance would occur when their candidate won the election, causing them to adjust 
their opinions. On the other hand, if a voter believed the media was biased against their 
candidate, and their candidate lost the election, no attitude shift would have occurred 
because no discordant thoughts would have been created with the outcome of the 
election.
Research on post-election cognitive dissonance has not consistently supported a 
choice-based or outcome-based dissonance. Cigler and Getter (1977) studied voters’ 
opinions of the candidates before and after the election and found clear evidence of 
depolarization (spreading of the alternatives) in the assessments for those who had 
supported the losing candidate. Although this supports outcome-based dissonance, it 
contradicts choice-based dissonance because the voters also made the choice to vote for 
their candidate. Granberg and Nanneman (1986) also found results supporting outcome- 
based dissonance for the 1980 election, where those supporting the losing candidate 
depolarized their assessments, however, those supporting Reagan further polarized their 
candidate opinions. Furthermore, a study concerning the 1976 Presidential election found 
that voters who supported the losing candidate tended to increase support for that 
candidate after the election, even as those voters also increased their favorability ratings 
of the winning candidate (Van Jones, 1977). The research does not provide a clear effect 
of either choice-based or outcome-based dissonance because clear support for one 
approach, directly contradicts the other approach. Unfortunately, most researchers tend to 
point to changing electoral contexts (differences between elections that cannot be 
replicated), as well as different methods and statistical procedures, as the primary reasons
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for inconsistent results.
Although few studies have attempted to reconcile the differences between choice- 
and outcome-based dissonance, Beasley and Joslyn (2001) sought to understand how 
these effects might interact with one another. They tested both choice-based and 
outcome-based dissonance, in a study that examined pre- and post-election attitudes from 
presidential elections between 1972 and 1996. Since choice- and outcome-based 
dissonance result in either polarization or depolarization of the candidates, they had 
voters rate the candidates on several different attributes, and created a change score 
between pre-election polarization and post-election polarization. To test choice-based 
dissonance theories of attitude change, they compared participants who had voted in the 
election to those who did not, and found that voters exhibited greater polarization 
between the candidates post-election than non-voters. They then tested outcome-based 
dissonance (by controlling for choice-based reactions) and found that those who 
supported the losing candidate decreased the differences between the candidates post­
election, by both increasing their support for the winner and decreasing their support for 
the loser. Beasley and Joslyn concluded that there seem to be two competing effects at 
work, not just one or the other, and this explains why previous dissonance research was 
inconclusive. They posit that there is an interactive effect between choice-based and 
outcome-based dissonance, but it remains unclear when one will have precedent over the 
other in some elections but not others. The current study hopes to shed light on this 
problem by comparing voters on their level of belief strength to determine those that 
might be more prone to choice-based dissonance effects or outcome-based dissonance 
effects.
6
A similar approach has been used previously. For instance, Tykocinski (2001) 
obtained candidate preferences and evaluations of each candidate’s chance of winning 
before and after the election. The results indicated that voters who supported the losing 
candidate tended to retroactively decrease the chances of that candidate winning. 
Tykocinski suggested that this was a way for the voter to begin coming to terms with the 
outcome of the election, which is consistent with outcome-based dissonance. Individual 
differences were also found, specifically that as disappointment with the election 
outcome increased, greater retroactive adjustments were made. Furthermore, individuals 
with a high need for control also exhibited a greater degree of retroactive estimate shift. 
Tykocinski’s research provides insight for a social/cognitive perspective for post-election 
voter effects. This research indicates that outcome-based dissonance may interact with 
how invested a person is in that outcome.
Electoral Fairness
The current study is also concerned with topics beyond those that compare 
candidates. In light of recent elections, particularly the 2000 Presidential election, with 
the Supreme Court making the final decision, recent research has focused on voters’ 
views of electoral fairness. Research concerning voter reactions in elections from 1964- 
2004 found mixed support for the notion that citizens who supported winning candidates 
had more positive views of the government, its leaders, and the entire political system, 
compared to those who supported losing candidates (Craig, Martinez, Gainous, & Kane, 
2006). Some have suggested that inconsistencies in the field can be explained by when 
data collection occurs, because no effects seem to be present directly after an election, but 
which is when many researchers collect post-election data (Anderson, Blais, Bowler,
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Donavan, & Listhaug, 2005). Therefore, Craig et al. examined the political trust of 
citizens during midterm elections and found that those who had supported the losing 
Presidential candidate had lower political trust than those who had supported the winning 
candidate. Overall, Craig et al. (2006) concluded that despite the legitimizing role 
elections are intended to have in democracies, they found that US citizens supporting 
losing candidates tend to have less political trust, see the government as less responsive, 
and are less satisfied with their democracy.
Since this study deals only with the outcome of a Presidential election, it is 
necessary, when examining attitudes about electoral fairness, to certify that the effects 
concerning electoral fairness are primarily the product of presidential election outcomes, 
and not congressional election outcomes. A study by Anderson and LoTempia (2002) 
found that presidential (instead of congressional) electoral outcomes primarily affect 
voters’ political trust. They found that results of congressional elections can lessen a 
voter’s political trust, but that this only occurs within the confines of their presidential 
candidate’s electoral outcome. Unfortunately, little research concerning political trust has 
examined potential differences between voters who had strong prior opinions about 
electoral fairness and those who did not.
Research Aim and Hypotheses
The present study sought to build upon prior research regarding post-election 
reactions by including three time-points across the 2008 US presidential election between 
John McCain and Barack Obama, ranging from the end of September, 2008 to the end of 
March, 2009. The same individuals responded at all three time-points so that participants 
were tracked over the course the election cycle, and attained a more detailed model of
how voters change their attitudes over time. For instance, with only two time-points, it is 
possible to know only if voters change their opinion over time, not if this change exists 
only directly after the election, or if such a changes are evident months later.
Although voters’ reactions to election outcomes have been studied previously, 
this study also examined relationships between the strength of a voter’s initial opinion 
and changes in the attitudes over time. For instance, voters with a weak opinion might be 
more susceptible to outside effects changing their opinion because their opinion is less 
rigid. Alternatively, it might be argued that those voters with the most invested in the 
outcome might feel more disappointment or excitement over the election outcome and 
might have larger attitude adjustments caused by outcome-based dissonance. The 
interaction between for whom the participants voted and their initial belief strength is 
expected to clarify post-election reactions, especially with regard to cognitive dissonance 
theories. Traditionally, post-election research has neglected these individual differences 
as they occur among voters within one election, but some have acknowledged that levels 
of voter investment vary between election years. Nevertheless, this is often unexamined 
and was included as an aspect of varying electoral contexts (Cigler & Getter, 1997; 
Nadeau & Blais, 1993). This study sought to understand how voters’ opinions change 
over time relative to their initial, pre-election opinion as a function of for whom they 
voted, as well as how strongly they held their initial belief.
For the items pertaining to the political parties and candidates, were expected to 
find that individuals with weak beliefs will adhere more closely to choice-based 
dissonance models and will subsequently experience polarization. The reasoning 
followed that those holding weak views about the candidates, as well as the political
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parties, will have viewed the candidates as more equally attractive (Festinger, 1957). 
Thus, the difficulty of their choice could be more relevant than the actual outcome, 
causing choice-based dissonance to take precedence.
Those with strong beliefs, however, were expected to adhere better to outcome- 
based dissonance, with McCain supporters depolarizing the candidates. Obama 
supporters with strong beliefs were expected to adhere more to an outcome-based 
dissonance model of post-election attitude change, but it was unclear whether 
polarization was expected, or if no changes would occur for those supporting the winning 
candidate. Those with strong beliefs about the candidates and political parties were 
expected to experience outcome-based dissonance because it is probable that less 
hesitation occurred when deciding between the candidates, as they clearly preferred one 
candidate to the other. Furthermore, it can be argued that their opinion was more 
important to them than those who have weak opinions, and greater dissonance should 
have occurred as a result (Festinger, 1957). Therefore, voters with strong beliefs were 
expected to be less affected by the dissonance created by choice, and outcome-based 
dissonance was expected to affect these individuals more for their post-election 
responses.
For non-comparative items, specifically political fairness items and other general 
political opinions, outcome-based dissonance was expected to have occurred whenever 
the outcome of the election causes a contradiction to the voter’s initial belief. In matters 
of political trust and fairness, McCain supporters were expected to experience a decrease 
in electoral fairness post-election, but as prior research suggests this opinion might only 
occur at the third time-point (Craig et al., 2006). It was unclear whether Obama
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supporters’ perceptions of the electoral process would have increased over time because 
this depended on their initial perception of electoral fairness.
It was also likely that those holding strong opinions about political trust would be 
those least reluctant to change their opinions in reaction to the election. For non­
comparative opinions, it was possible that those with strong beliefs would produce larger 
changes when faced with dissonance, as their initial belief would have a greater 
likelihood of contradicting the new information to a greater degree than voters with 
moderate opinions. On the other hand, the strength of the belief may provide a buffer to 
the attitude changing effects that cognitive dissonance would normally produce. Overall, 
it was hypothesized that Belief Strength would interact with Vote Choice to influence the 
type and degree of dissonance that occurred post-election.
Method
Participants
The participants were 221 undergraduates from Introductory Psychology courses 
who participated in all three time-points, and 19 participants were excluded from the 
analyses for either not having voted in the election, or choosing a candidate other than 
John McCain or Barack Obama, leaving 202 participants for the analyses. The 
participants included 128 women (69%) and 64 men (31%), which is a typical male-to- 
female ratio where the study was conducted.
Measures
The questionnaire for T1 (Appendix A) contained three different types of 
questions. The first type was descriptive in nature, asking the participant’s age, sex, and 
ascertaining whether or not the participant is a US citizen who is registered to vote. The
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second type of question was comprised of politically oriented questions that includes a 
left-right (liberal-conservative) political belief self-placement scale, an item regarding the 
candidate for whom the participant planned to vote, how decided the participant was in 
their planned vote choice, the participant's favorability toward the candidates, and the 
participant’s view of the political parties. The third type of question concern political 
fairness and general public opinion questions. Specifically, these items assessed the 
fairness of the American electoral process, how much participants felt their vote would 
make a difference in the election, their opinion on the country's current direction, and 
whether or not they view the media as biased. Some items were created specifically for 
this study and others were inspired by or adapted from Pew Research reports (2007).
The questionnaires employed in T2 and T3 (Appendix B) consist of questions 
similar to those in T1. The first section, however, contains affective questions that 
assessed the participant's emotional state. These questions were presented in a 
randomized order for each participant. These items will not be analyzed in the current 
study and will be examined in future research, but because they were presented prior to 
the other questions it is relevant to mention their inclusion. The remaining sections for T2 
and T3 were identical to the questions in T1, with past-tense wording where appropriate. 
Procedure
Participants completed the T1 measures through a data collection website between 
September 16 and October 20 as part of a course requirement. These dates ensure that 
participants completed time-point one (T l) after both conventions had already occurred 
(Democratic Convention from August 25-28; Republican Convention from September 1- 
4), and at least two weeks before the presidential election on November 4, 2008. For
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time-point two (T2), participants were sent an email invitation the day after the election 
(November 5), with the vast majority (>90%) completing the questionnaire on November 
5, and all participants completing T2 by November 7 after a reminder email was sent.
This time-window ensures that the responses collected at T2 are the participant’s 
immediate reactions to the election.
For time-point 3 (T3), some of the original participants took another introductory 
course in the Spring semester that also requires research participation, allowing T3 to be 
collected similarly to T1 for these participants (approximately 31%). The remaining 
participants for T3 were contacted via email, in a way procedurally similar to T2. The 
third wave of data was collected between February 24, 2009 and March 20, 2009, and 
was well after the Presidential Inauguration ceremony, which took place January 21, 
2009.
Design
Aside from a within-subjects factor with 3 time-points, 2 between-subjects factors 
are also included in the design. The first between-subjects factor is Vote Choice and is 
defined as for whom the participant voted (either Barack Obama or John McCain). The 
second factor is an item-based Belief Strength that classifies the participant’s belief as 
either Weak (responses of 3 ,4 , or 5) or Strong (responses of 1, 2 ,6 , or 7). For example, 
when responding to the item, “What is your overall view of the Republican Party?” , 
(Scale of 1- Very Unfavorable, 2- Unfavorable, 3- Somewhat Unfavorable, 4- Neither, 5- 
Somewhat Favorable, 6- Favorable, 7- Very Favorable) two participants responding with 
scores of 1 and 7 would be grouped together into the Strong belief category, where as two 
participants responding with a 4 and 5 would be grouped into the Weak belief group. This
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factor was constructed by the strength of the participant’s response at T1 for each 
dependent measure to avoid confounding Belief Strength with post-election reactions. 
Although constructing a categorical variable out of a continuous measure may appear to 
be arbitrary, the categories constructed here were not arbitrary, but distinguished people 
who had strong opinions and weak opinions as according to the response scale.
Furthermore, including a factor for Belief Strength allows voters to be compared 
on the basis of the strength of belief, while solving the confounding nature of partisanship 
in a participant’s response. For instance, voters supporting the Obama-Biden ticket had 
different opinions on the Democratic Party than voters supporting the McCain-Palin 
ticket, and this effect is accounted for by the Vote Choice factor.
Results
The primary questions of interest were examined with a series of ANOVAS, 3 
(Time) x 2 (Vote Choice) x 2 (Item-Based Belief Strength). A separate ANOVA was 
conducted for each dependent item. Simple effects were tested using multivariate 
analaysis of variance (MANOVA) repeated measure, and repeated measure 7-tests were 
conducted for simple, simple effects analysis (SSEA) across time when necessary. 
Repeated measure 7-tests were needed when comparing levels of between-subject factors 
across time-points. This analysis was necessary because between-subjects simple effects 
within each time-point are not independent and cannot be pooled for the within-subject 
levels (Nichols, 1993).
Simple effects for three-way interactions could have been analyzed differently, but 
for this study, the effects of Belief Strength within the factor of Vote Choice, (i.e., how 
Weak vs. Strong Beliefs change across time for McCain Voters and Obama voters)
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corresponded to the research aims of the paper. This is because these simple effects 
examine how belief strength alters change across time for those who supported the losing 
candidate and the winning candidate. Additionally, although between-subjects simple 
effects comparing Vote Choice are somewhat redundant with analyses involving partisan 
items, matters of electoral fairness and trust are not overtly partisan and between-subjects 
simple effects will be considered for such items, when appropriate.
The sample was not evenly divided between John McCain and Barack Obama, as 
59 (29%) respondents voted for McCain, and 143 (71%) voted for Obama, however, the 
statistical design treated the cells as equal. The results were considered according to their 
adherence to cognitive dissonance models of change, particularly choice-based 
dissonance, which results in polarization between two choices for both Obama and 
McCain supporters. Outcome-based dissonance, on the other hand results in 
depolarization between choices for McCain supporters, or for non-comparative items, an 
adjustment o f a prior attitude. The presentation o f results is organized around specific 
research questions. The results for items regarding political parties will be presented first, 
followed by candidate favorability, electoral process effects, public opinion items, and 
finally gender effects.
Political Parties
Analyses for the opinion of the Republican Party produced a significant three-way 
interaction among Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength, that showed that for the factor 
of Vote Choice, the direction of change across time depended on Belief strength (Table 1, 
Means and SD Table 3). Simple interaction effects analyses were tested separately for 
Obama and McCain voters, and found that Obama supporters with Strong beliefs
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experienced significant change over time, F(2,396)=14.56,/? < .01, as did those with 
Weak beliefs, /7(2,396)=5.85,/? < .01. SSEA found that for Obama supporters holding 
Strong beliefs about the Republican Party, a significant increase occured at T2, /(73) = 
5.072, p  < .01, and this attitude was maintained at T3,p  > .05. Conversely, Obama 
supporters holding Weak beliefs about the Republican Party, show an opposite effect 
(Figure 1), where they immediately decreased their opinions of the Republican Party at 
T2, /(68) = 2.35,/? < .05, and keep that opinion steady at T3,p  > .05. Obama supporters 
with weak beliefs decreased their perception of the Republican Party, which supports a 
choice-based dissonance, whereas those with Strong beliefs increased their opinions and 
do not adhere to either choice- or outcome-based dissonance.
Tests for simple interaction effects found that McCain supporters with Weak beliefs 
experienced significant change over time, F{2, 396) = 3.91 ,p  < .05, but those with Strong 
beliefs did not change their opinion significantly,/? > .05. SSEA were conducted and 
found that McCain supporters with Weak Beliefs had an immediate increase in their 
favorability of the Republican party at T2, ^(33) = 2.73,/? < .05, but their opinion of the 
Republican Party decreased in equal magnitude between T2 and T3, /(33) = 2.20, p  < .05, 
with no difference in opinion between T1 and T3 (M n  = 4.68, SD = .64; M t3 = 4.68, SD 
= 1.09),/? > .05. McCain supporters with Weak beliefs increased their views of the 
Republican Party, which suggests a polarization between the parties, and supports choice- 
based dissonance, whereas those with Strong beliefs did not change over time, and do not 
adhere to either choice- or outcome-based dissonance.
Analyses for the opinion of the Democratic Party produced a significant three-way 
interaction between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength, showed that within Vote
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Choice, change across time depended on Belief Strength (Table 1, Means and SD in 
Table 4). Simple interaction effects analyses found that Obama supporters with Weak 
beliefs changed significantly across time F(2, 296) = 8.02,/? < .01, whereas those with 
Strong beliefs do not,/? > .05. SSEA found that Obama supporters with Weak beliefs 
showed an immediate increase in favorability for the Democratic Party at T2, 7(58) = 
2.87,/? < .01, which is maintained for T3 ,P >  .05 (Figure 2). These results were 
consistent with the previous results, and showed that Obama supporters with Weak 
beliefs experienced choice-based dissonance, whereas those with Strong beliefs did not 
adhere to either model.
The tests for simple interaction effects also found a significant change for McCain 
supporters with Weak beliefs, F(2, 396) = 4.83,/? < .01, but showed no change over time 
for those with Strong beliefs, /? > .05. SSEA show that those with Weak beliefs 
experienced a sharp decrease in favorability at T2, 7(36) = 2.64,/? < .05, and maintained 
this opinion for T3 ,P >  .05. These results also support the hypothesis that those with 
Weak beliefs would experience choice-based dissonance.
The analysis comparing differences between the Republican and Democratic parties 
found a significant interaction between Time and Belief Strength (Table 1, Means and SD 
in Table 5). Tests for simple effects found that those with Weak beliefs changed 
significantly over time (Figure 3), F(2,400) = 7.58,/? < .01, as did those with Strong 
beliefs, 7^(2,400) = 5.87,/? < 01. SSEA between the time-points found those holding 
Weak beliefs about the differences between the two parties increased at T 2 ,7(138) = 4.10, 
/? < .05, and maintained this increase for T3,/? > .05. Those with strong beliefs decreased 
slightly over time, with T1 only significantly different from T 3 ,7(62) = 2.77,/? < .01.
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Candidate Favorability
Analyses of the favorability of the McCain-Palin ticket produced a main effect of 
change across time (Table 1). The favorability of the ticket decreased over time (Table 6), 
but this effect was qualified by a three-way interaction among Time, Vote Choice, and 
Belief Strength, particularly that the direction of change over time within the levels of 
Vote Choice, depended on Belief Strength (Figure 4). Simple effects analyses found that 
Obama supporters with Weak beliefs changed significantly over time, F(2,396) = 15.86, 
p  < .01, as did those with Strong beliefs, F(2,396) = 5.90,/? < .01. SSEA found opposite 
effects depending on Belief Strength, specifically that Obama supporters with Strong 
beliefs increased their opinion of the McCain-Palin ticket at T2, £(93) = 2.99, p  < .01, but 
their opinion returned to baseline at T3, £(93) = 3.33 ,P <  .01, with no significant 
difference between T1 and T3,p  > .05. Obama supporters with Weak beliefs, however, 
showed a sharp decrease in favorability at T2, £(48) = 4.50,/? < .01, and this opinion was 
maintained for T3 ,P >  .05. Obama supporters with Weak beliefs showed a pattern of 
change consistent with choice-based dissonance. In contrast, those with Strong beliefs do 
not have a clear pattern of change across time, other than a depolarization at T2.
The tests for simple interaction effects for McCain supporters also found opposite 
effects over time depending on a participant’s Belief strength. McCain supporters with 
Strong beliefs changed significantly across time, F(2, 396) = 15.23,/? < .01, as did those 
with Weak beliefs, F{2, 396) = 3.16,/? < .05. SSEA found that McCain supporters with 
Strong beliefs showed a moderate decrease between T1 and T2, £(28) = 3.88,/? < .01, and 
another moderate decrease at T3, £(28) = 2.92,/? < .01, showing a linear downward trend 
in McCain-Palin favorability. On the other hand, McCain supporters with Weak beliefs
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showed a slight, though not significant (p > .05) increase at T2, and then experienced a 
decrease between T2 and T3 that brought their opinion slightly below baseline, and 
produced a significant difference between T2 and T3, t{29) = 2.54, p  > .05, but not T1 
and T3,/? > .05. Again, those with Weak beliefs showed a choice-based dissonance 
pattern of change, whereas McCain supporters with Strong beliefs increased their 
opinion, which was consistent with outcome-based dissonance.
Analyses of the favorability of the Obama-Biden ticket produced a main effect of 
change across time (Table 1; means and SD in Table 7). This effect was qualified by an 
interaction between Time and Vote Choice (Figure 5), and a three-way interaction among 
Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength showing that the direction of change over time 
within the levels of Vote Choice depended on Belief Strength (Figure 6). Tests for simple 
interaction effects for the three-way interaction found that Obama voters with Strong 
beliefs did not find any significant changes across time, but Obama supporters with Weak 
beliefs did change their opinions over time, F(2, 396) = 48.93,/? < .01. SSEA found 
Obama supporters with Weak beliefs showed a sharp increase at T2, ^(46) = 7.02,/? < .01, 
and this was maintained for T3,/? > .05.
Tests for simple interaction effects found that McCain supporters experienced 
opposite directions of change depending on their initial Belief Strength. Those with 
Strong beliefs changed over time, F(2, 396) = 11.74, p  < .01, as did those with Weak 
beliefs, F(2, 396) = 9.74,/? < .01. SSEA found that McCain supporters with Strong 
beliefs showed an increase in Obama-Biden favorability at T2, /(28) = 2.56,/? < .05, 
which was maintained for T3 ,p  > .05. Conversely, McCain supporters with Weak beliefs 
showed a sharp decrease at T2, /(29) = 3.03,/? < .01, and this was maintained at T3,p >
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.05. McCain supporters with Weak beliefs did not fully polarize their opinions of the 
candidates, but their pattern of change followed choice-based dissonance, whereas those 
with Strong beliefs depolarized their opinions about the candidates and supported an 
outcome-based dissonance model.
Electoral Process
Although between-subjects simple effects comparing Vote Choice are fairly 
redundant for analyses involving partisan items, matters of electoral fairness and trust are 
not overtly partisan, so between-subjects simple effects will be considered, when 
appropriate, in this subsection. Analyses for whether or not participants felt their vote 
made a difference produced a main effect across time (Table 2; Means and SD in Table
8), which was qualified by an interaction between Time and Vote Choice which shows 
opposite directions in change across time depending on for whom the participant voted. 
(Figure 7). Tests of simple effects found that Obama supporters changed their views 
significantly over time, F(2,394) = 13.16,/? < .01, as did McCain supporters, F(2,394) = 
18.56,/? < .01. SSEA found that Obama supporters experienced an increase how much 
they felt their vote made a difference at T2, /(141) = 4.98,/? < .01, with a partial return to 
baseline atT3,r(141) = 4 .38 ,/?< .01 .In  contrast, McCain supporters showed a decrease 
in how much their vote made a difference at T2, /(57) = 2.56, /? < .05, and experienced a 
similar decrease at T3, t(57) = 2.66, /? < .01. These results showed that McCain 
supporters experienced outcome-based dissonance, as did Obama supporters.
This interaction was also examined as a between-subject interaction within the 
time-points to understand how voters for winning candidates felt their vote made a 
difference relative to those whose candidate lost. Examined in the manner, the interaction
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shows that differences for Vote Choice were only present post-election. Simple effects 
testing the between-subject effect of Vote Choice within each time-point found no 
significant differences at T1 ,/? > .05, a significant main effect at T2, F(l,195) = 14.70,/? 
< .01, and a significant main effect at T3 F ( l, 195) = 17.64,/? < .01.
Analyses for participant perceptions of fairness in the American electoral process 
found a main effect across time (Table 2; Means and SD in Table 9) which was qualified 
by an interaction between Time and Vote Choice, showing change across time depended 
on Vote Choice (Figure 8), as well as an interaction between Time and Belief Strength 
(Figure 9). Although the interactions are significant,/? < .05, it should be noted that the 
magnitude of attitude change being relatively small, with the changes occurring all within 
1 point on the scale. Tests for simple effects for the Time x Vote Choice interaction 
found that Obama supporters experienced change across time, F(2,378) = 10.71,/? < .01, 
whereas McCain supporters did not. SSEA were conducted and found Obama supporters 
showed a slight, though not significant (p > .05), increase in electoral process fairness at 
T2, with a significant increase at T3, /(136) = 3.20,/? < .01. These results showed 
outcome-based dissonance occurring for Obama supporters, but not McCain supporters.
The interaction between Time and Belief Strength showed that the direction of 
change over time within the levels of Vote Choice depended on Belief Strength (Figure
9). Simple effects analyses found those with Strong beliefs showed a significant change 
across time, F(2,378) = 3.48,/? < .01. Voters with Weak beliefs about electoral fairness 
also exhibited significant change across time, F(2, 378) = 8.87,/? < .01. SSEA show that 
those with Strong beliefs decreased in their opinion about electoral fairness at T2, and 
then they experienced a significant rebound effect at T3, ^(57) = 3.19,/? < .05. In contrast,
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those with Weak beliefs experienced a small, though not significantp  > .05, increase at 
T2, with a more pronounced increase at T3, t{ 132) = 2.43, p  < .01.
Simple effects analyses for the between-subjects effects across time for electoral 
process fairness, found a significant difference between those voting for Obama and 
McCain at T l, F ( l, 187) = 23.75,/? < .01, at T2, F(l,187) = 5.30, p  <.05, and T3, 
i7(l,187) = 4.89,/? <.05. As Figure 8 shows, differences between Obama and McCain 
supporters decreased post-election.
Analyses for the fairness of using the Electoral College as opposed to a popular- 
vote produced a main effect across Time (Table 2, means and SD Table 10), which was 
qualified by an interaction between Time and Vote Choice (Figure 10), as well as a three- 
way interaction between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength (Figure 11). Simple 
effects analyses for the Time x Vote Choice interaction, specifically that change across 
time depended on Vote Choice, found that Obama supporters experienced a significant 
change across time, F(2,396) = 8.34,/? < .01, whereas McCain supporters, as a whole, did 
not experience change across time,/? > .05. SSEA show that Obama supporters had an 
overall increase in electoral college fairness at T2, ^(141) = 2.56,/? < .01, which was 
maintained at T3,/? > .05. Therefore, Obama supporters experienced outcome-based 
dissonance, but McCain supporters did not.
Simple interaction effects analyses for the three-way interaction found that Obama 
supporters with Strong beliefs changed over time, F(2, 392) = 10.61 p  < .01, but those 
with Weak beliefs did not,/? > .05. The interaction shows that within Vote Choice, 
change across time depended on Belief Strength. SSEA to test effects between time- 
points show that Obama supporters with Strong beliefs experienced an increase in
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electoral college fairness at T2, ^(50) = 2.22, p  < .05, which was maintained at T3,p  >
.05. The test for simple interaction effects also found that McCain supporters with Weak 
beliefs experienced significant change over time, F(2,392) = 3.38,/? < .05. As Figure 11 
shows, those with Weak beliefs showed a slight decrease at T2, but this was not 
significant,/? > .05, however, at T3, a significant increase occurred and brought electoral 
college fairness slightly above baseline at T3, /(35) = 2.61 ,P <  .05. Obama supporters 
with Strong beliefs adhere to an outcome-based dissonance, whereas McCain voters with 
weak beliefs contradict outcome-based dissonance.
Simple effects testing the between-subject effect of Vote Choice within each time- 
point found a significant difference between Obama supporters and McCain supporters at 
T l, F (l,1 9 6 ) = 39.47,/? < .01, again at T2, F(l,196) = 9.51,/? < .01, and at T3, F(l,196)
= 8.79, p  < .01. As Figure 10 shows, however, the difference is most prominent at T l, 
with McCain and Obama voters’ opinions on electoral college fairness converging at T2, 
and T3.
Public Opinion Items
Analyses for perceptions of media bias on the American public produced a main 
effect of Time that was qualified by an interaction between Time and Vote Choice, and 
an interaction between Time and Belief Strength (Table 2, means and SD Table 11). The 
interaction between Time and Vote Choice showed that change across time depended on 
Vote Choice (Figure 12). Simple effects analyses found Obama supporters changed their 
opinion on media bias across time, F(2,392) = 46.43, p  < .05, however McCain 
supporters did not,/? > .05. SSEA showed that Obama supporters decreased their 
opinions about media bias at T2, /(138) = 8.10,/? < .01, and maintained this opinion for
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T3 ,/? > .05. Simple effects for the Time and Belief Strength interaction (Figure 13), show 
that those holding Strong opinions about media bias changed their opinion over time,
F(2,392) = 48.90,/? < .01, but those with weak opinions did not,/? > .05. SSEA showed 
that those with Strong opinions experienced a decrease at T2, /(132) = 8.22,/? < .01, and 
kept this view at T3,/? > .05. These results support outcome-based dissonance.
Simple effects testing the between-subject effect of Vote Choice within each time 
point found that at T l, no significant differences existed between Obama and McCain 
voters,/? > .05. There were significant differences between Obama and McCain voters at 
T2, F(l,194) = 26.24,/? < .01, and also at T3, F( 1,194) = 15.77,/? > .01. The interaction 
showed that differences produced from Vote Choice depended on whether it was pre- or 
post-election.
Analyses for if  participants felt that the country was on the right track produced a 
main effect across Time, which was qualified by an interaction between Time and Vote 
Choice, an interaction between Time and Belief Strength, and a three-way interaction 
between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength (Table 2, Means and SD Table 12). The 
Time and Vote Choice interaction showed that direction of change across time depended 
on Vote Choice (Figure 14). Simple effects analyses found that Obama supporters 
significantly changed their belief over time, F(2,394) = 227.18,/? < .01, as did McCain 
supporters, F(2, 394) = 35.47,/? < .01. SSEA found that McCain supporters decreased 
their opinion at T2, /(58) = 4.52,/? > .01, and further decreased their opinion about the 
country’s direction at T3, t(58) = 3.37,/? > .01. In contrast, Obama supporters showed a 
sharp increase at T2, /(139) = 17.34,/? < .01, with a sharp decrease back to baseline at T3, 
/(141)= 18.10,/? <.01.
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The interaction between Time and Belief Strength interaction showed that the 
magnitude of change across time depended on Belief Strength (Figure 15). Simple effects 
analyses found that those with Strong beliefs changed their beliefs across time, F(2, 394) 
= 112.73, p  < .01, as did those with Weak opinions, F(2,394) = 41.50,/? < .01. SSEA 
found that those with Strong beliefs had a very marked increase at T2, ^(51) = 10.30,/? < 
.01, and ended up at the midpoint between T l and T2 for T3, ^(51) = 10.49,/? < .01. On 
the other hand, those with Weak beliefs increased slightly at T2, /(146) = 4.80,/? < .01, 
and then experienced a decrease below their initial opinion at T3, /(146) = 11.74,/? < .01.
The interaction for the Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength interaction show 
that the direction of change across time depends on Vote Choice, whereas the magnitidue 
of this change depends on Belief Strength (Figure 16). Simple effects analyses found that 
Obama supporters with Strong beliefs had significant change over time, F(2, 390) = 
223.69,/? < .01, as did those with Weak beliefs, F(2, 390) = 117.35,/? < .01. SSEA found 
that Obama supporters with Strong beliefs experienced a more extreme increase of their 
opinion of the country’s direction at T2, ^(44) = 16.99,/? < .01, and then experienced a 
significant decrease at T3, /(44) = 12.64,/? < .05, but did not return fully to baseline as T3 
was significantly higher than T l, /(44) = 10.47, p  < .01. Obama supporters with Weak 
beliefs experienced a less extreme pattern of those who hold strong beliefs, and 
experienced an increase at T2, /(94) = 13.65,/? < .01, and experienced a significant 
decrease at T3, t{94) = 13.42,/? < .01, but are significantly higher than baseline opinion at 
T3, t{95) = 2.53,/? < .05. Tests for simple interaction effects also found that only McCain 
supporters with Weak beliefs experienced change across time, F(2, 390) = 44.76,/? < .01. 
SSEA find that McCain supporters with Weak beliefs significantly decreased their views
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of the country’s direction at T2, /(51) = 5.33, p  < .01, and decreased this opinion again at 
T3, ^(51) = 3.30,p  < .01.
Gender Effects
Men and women were not equally represented in the sample (69% women), 
therefore a chi-square test was run to determine if one gender was more likely to vote for 
the Obama-Biden ticket or the McCain-Palin ticket, and was not significant at/? > .05. 
Similarly, chi-squares between each Belief Strength and gender were also found to be not 
significant, p  > .05, with the exception of Did Vote Make a Difference, with women more 
likely to have weak opinions about whether their vote made a difference as compared to 
males, who had a more equal distribution between strong and weak beliefs, x ( f  N  = 
201) = 16.19,/? < .01. Although gender differences are important to consider in political 
and psychological research, the questions tackled by this specific project do not 
necessitate any further analysis of potential gender differences, and gender was excluded 
from the rest of the analysis.
Discussion
The hypotheses that voters with Weak beliefs about the candidates and political 
parties would exhibit choice-based dissonance, whereas those with Strong beliefs would 
experience outcome-based dissonance were supported. General hypotheses for the 
direction of McCain supporters’ responses for the electoral fairness items were not 
confirmed for outcome-based dissonance. Overall, Belief Strength was an important 
factor in the analyses, either indicating similarity between the candidates and parties, or 
indicating the level of personal importance in the issue examined. A trend also emerged 
in the results, where those with Weak opinions tended to have more fleeting, and reactive
26
responses, whereas those with Strong opinions had more controlled, tempered reactions 
over time. The sections follow the same layout as the results section, starting with 
political parties, progressing to candidate favorability, electoral fairness, general public 
opinion, but finishes with a section on limitations and future directions.
Political Parties
Both items assessing the favorability of the political parties had three-way 
interactions between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength (Figures 1 & 2). When 
considering the results, one can see that Obama supporters with Weak beliefs decreased 
their opinion of the Republican Party, and increased their opinion of the Democratic 
Party, showing polarization between the two, and confirming a choice-based dissonance 
model. Obama supporters with Strong beliefs, however, exhibited a significant increase 
in their opinion of the Republican Party, and experienced no significant changes in their 
opinion of the Democratic Party across time. This indicated a depolarization of the two 
parties for Obama supporters with Strong beliefs, which supports neither choice- nor 
outcome-based dissonance models.
For McCain supporters, the results indicated that McCain supporters with Weak 
beliefs experienced an increase in their opinion of the Republican Party at T2, but this 
was a momentary increase that did not persist at T3. Their opinion of the Democratic 
Party decreased sharply at T2, and maintained this decrease at T3. These results indicated 
that McCain supporters with Weak beliefs about the political parties exhibited a 
polarization of the parties, which supports a choice-based dissonance approach. McCain 
supporters with Strong beliefs about the political parties, however, exhibited no
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significant changes in their opinion of the Democratic Party or the Republican Party 
across time, also contradicting choice- and outcome-based dissonance theories.
Overall, when considering opinions of the political parties, voters with Weak 
beliefs about the political parties polarized the parties post-election, and supported a 
choice-based dissonance model. Voters with strong beliefs, however, exhibited little 
change in political party favorability, and did not adhere to choice- or outcome-based 
dissonance. This evidence supports the hypothesis that those with Weak beliefs saw the 
parties as more similar than those with Strong beliefs, leading them to make a more 
difficult choice when voting, and therefore their dissonance reflected this. Those with 
Strong beliefs, however, did not make a difficult decision on election day, and therefore 
exhibited less choice-based dissonance, but did not exhibit more outcome-based 
dissonance either. Obama voters with strong beliefs might have shown some sympathy 
for the Republican Party, which might explain the increase in their opinion. It stands to 
reason that partisan ties can not be cut as easily as candidate support, even under the 
duress of psychological tension, and this might explain why McCain voters with Strong 
Beliefs do not show outcome-based dissonance, being that the outcome was not as 
relevant to their opinion of the party.
Candidate Favorability
Both items concerning the favorability of the candidates had three-way 
interactions between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength (Figures 4 & 6). Obama 
supporters with Weak beliefs showed a decrease in McCain-Palin favorability at T2, 
which was also maintained at T3, whereas they increased the favorability of Obama- 
Biden at T2 and maintained this for T3. Therefore, Obama supporters with Weak beliefs
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about the candidates, showed polarization of the candidates post-election, which supports 
choice-based dissonance. Obama supporters with Strong beliefs, however, showed an 
increase in favorability of McCain-Palin at T2, which then returned to baseline in T3, but 
did not change their opinion of Obama-Biden over time. This indicates that Obama 
supporters with Strong beliefs depolarized their opinions of the candidates at T2, and 
returned to their original polarization at T3, which does not fully support choice- or 
outcome-based dissonance.
McCain supporters, on the other hand, showed that those with Weak beliefs did 
not significantly increase or decrease their opinion from their view at T l , but they did 
experience an increase at T2, that is significantly different from their decrease in 
favorability at T3. For Obama-Biden, McCain supporters with Weak beliefs showed a 
sharp decrease in their favorability at T2, which was maintained at T3. These results 
indicated that at T2, polarization between the candidates occurs, which lessened at T3, 
but did not reach baseline. Although the post-election reaction for McCain supporters 
with weak beliefs did not perfectly adhere to a model, it more closely resembled choice- 
based dissonance. McCain supporters with Strong beliefs about the candidates, however, 
showed a decrease in McCain-Palin favorability at T2, and at T3, but showed an increase 
in Obama-Biden favorability at T2, which was maintained at T3. These results indicate 
that McCain supporters with Strong beliefs depolarized their opinions of the candidates 
post-election, and followed an outcome-based dissonance approach.
Overall, for candidate favorability items, belief strength interacted with vote 
choice in how attitudes changed across time. Those with weak beliefs adhered to choice- 
based dissonance, and those with strong beliefs supported an outcome-based dissonance.
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As hypothesized, supporters of both candidates with weak beliefs tended to polarize their 
opinions. McCain supporters, however, seemed to slightly lessen their polarization at T3, 
whereas Obama supporters did not. It can be argued that McCain and Obama supporters 
with Strong beliefs did not have to make a difficult choice regarding the candidates, 
meaning that their attitudes over time reflected an outcome-based dissonance.
Electoral Process
For the item regarding the participant’s opinion of whether or not their vote made 
a difference a significant interaction was found between Time and Vote Choice (Figure 
7). The results showed that there was an increase directly after the election for Obama 
voters, with a partial return to baseline at T3. McCain supporters, however, experienced 
a decrease in how much their vote made a difference at T2, and again at T3. Additionally, 
within T l , simple effects of Vote Choice found that Obama and McCain supporters 
shared similar views on how much their vote would make a difference during T l , and 
their differences in opinion only occur post-election.
These results indicated that by supporting the losing candidate, a voter felt that 
their contribution to the democratic process was somehow less, and vice versa for a voter 
supporting the winning candidate. The fact that McCain voters felt their vote made even 
less of an impact at T3 shows how long lasting this effect was, especially considering that 
Obama voters had returned to baseline by that time. One explanation might be that even 
though all voters are equally important in a democracy, those who do not contribute to 
the winning candidate might have felt that their vote was, in a sense, a wasted vote. The 
conflicting thoughts between the importance of a vote and the insignificance of their vote 
to the outcome, however, is a retroactive adjustment of how much their vote matters in
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response to the outcome, and is an example of outcome-based dissonance. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the participants were not asked how much they felt their vote would 
make a difference in the next election (they were only asked about the 2008 election) so it 
is not necessarily the case that McCain supporters will carry these opinions over to the 
next election. Overall, reactions for this item supported the hypothesis that for electoral 
fairness items, McCain supporters would decrease their opinions over time, and Obama 
supporters would either increase, or stay the same. This result reflected outcome-based 
dissonance for both groups, as voters had a relatively neutral opinion at T l . Thus, a 
positive result for Obama supporters would contradict the initial neutral opinion, and 
their opinion would adjust upward, and vice versa for Mccain supporters.
The Time x Vote Choice interaction for electoral process fairness (Figure 8) 
showed a slight linear increase for Obama supporters, and McCain voters experienced no 
significant changes across time. This finding does not support the hypothesis that McCain 
supporters would decrease their opinions of electoral process fairness, however Craig et 
al. found their effect 2 years after the election. Although it is possible that McCain 
supporters might eventually decrease their opinions of electoral fairness, it should be 
noted that in Figure 8, that fairness was even somewhat higher at T3 than that of the 
baseline assessment. As Figure 10 also indicates, a similar interaction was found for the 
item concerning Electoral College fairness, showing that this effect was consistent across 
other opinions of fairness. Additionally, participants were not questioned specifically 
about the fairness present in the 2008 election, but were questioned regarding their beliefs 
about the fairness of the electoral process in the US. It was unexpected that Obama voters 
would experience an increase in electoral fairness, and a potential explanation for this
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attitude change was the destructive effects of the 2000 presidential election to political 
trust for Democrats. Previous research (Craig, et al., 2006) found that in the 2000 
election, voters supporting Gore were more likely to resist legitimizing Bush as the new 
president. Political trust may be slightly lower for Democrats, overall, for this reason, and 
a clear victory in 2008 may have helped to repair democrats’ political trust. The idea that 
this election helped to repair electoral fairness for Obama voters was supported by the 
between-subjects results showing that McCain supporters had significantly higher 
opinions in electoral process fairness than Obama supporters, with this difference 
lessened in T2 and T3, indicating a convergence.
A closer inspection of this trend can be found in the three-way interaction 
between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength for Electoral College fairness (Figure 
11). These effects indicated that Obama supporters with Weak beliefs about the fairness 
of the Electoral College did not change their opinion over time, nor did McCain 
supporters with Strong beliefs. On the other hand, Obama supporters with Strong beliefs 
increased their beliefs across time, which was consistent with outcome-based dissonance. 
McCain supporters with Weak beliefs about Electoral College fairness experienced a 
slight decrease at T2, with a significant increase from T2 for T3, which was also 
indicative of outcome-based dissonance. Outcome-based dissonance would occur 
whenever a prior belief was challenged by new information. Mccain voters, even those 
with Weak beliefs initially believed the system was more fair than unfair (Figure 11), but 
the candidate they thought was best did not win. Therefore, these voters had a fleeting 
decrease in fairness at T2, but this was repaired in T3. McCain supporters with Strong 
beliefs, however, showed no significant change across time, which would contradict
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outcome-based dissonance, but it is likely that the initial Strength o f the belief provided a 
buffer to outcome-based dissonance. Obama supporters with Strong Beliefs, on the other 
hand, had a linear increase in Electoral College fairness, which was outcome-based 
dissonance interacting with their strong beliefs about fairness. Specifically, Obama 
supporters with Strong beliefs tended to believe that the Electoral College was not a fair 
system (potential remnants from 2000) and when their candidate won using such a 
system, they changed their opinion in reaction to that belief. Even though these effects 
are opposite one another, outcome-based dissonance is still supported by these results 
because the outcome should be opposite for those supporting a winner, and those 
supporting a loser.
Overall, these results did not confirm previous findings, indicating that those who 
supported the losing candidate should lessen their views of fairness in the election. One 
potential difference was that this question asked about the electoral process as a whole, 
not only this election. It may have been easier to dismiss the fairness o f one election, but 
to have ended up questioning the entire process as a result of one's candidate losing is 
less likely. It was interesting, however that Obama voters increased over time. This 
finding demonstrated how elections could repair a voter's trust in the political system, and 
reaffirm electoral fairness and legitimacy, since this election was the first presidential 
election that Democrats won since the questionable outcome of the 2000 election. 
Additionally, Belief Strength did not play a prominent role in attitude changes across 
time.
Public Opinion
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For the item concerning whether the media biased the decisions of the American 
public, an interaction was found between Time and Vote Choice (Figure 12). This 
interaction supported outcome-based dissonance because Obama voters initially believed 
that the media is biased, however, once their candidate was elected they adjust downward 
to remove the idea that their candidate was elected because of a biased media. McCain 
voters, however, had no reaction across time because they believed the media is biased at 
T l, and their candidate did not win the election, so no dissonance was created. An 
interaction between Time and Belief Strength was also found regarding media bias 
(Figure 13). Those with weak beliefs exhibited no change over time, whereas those with 
Strong beliefs showed a marked decrease at T2, which persisted for T3. It is unclear why 
those with strong beliefs would suddenly decrease their opinion, though one potential 
explanation may be that participants honestly perceived less media bias during this 
election that allowed those with an extreme view to adjust downward.
The question about the country being on the right track yielded several 
interactions. An interaction between Time and Vote Choice (Figure 14) showed the true 
degree of change in direction for a country after an election, and the participants had 
extreme opposite reactions at T2. Both McCain voters and Obama voters decreased their 
opinions from T2 to T3, which was most likely an effect of the electoral context. The 
economy began having poor results in November directly after the election, and the was 
still struggling as of March 2009, when T3 was assessed. Therefore, the responses at T3 
are probably a combination of the electoral context, as well as an expected partial return 
to baseline after the initial extreme responses at T2 for Obama supporters. An interaction 
between Time and Belief Strength (Figure 15) shows how those with Strong beliefs about
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the country being on the right track were more likely to have a more extreme reaction at 
T2, although the direction is similar for both Weak and Strong groups. At T3, however, 
both groups are in agreement. This is most likely an effect of personal investment in an 
issue (Tykocinski, 2001). Those who held strong opinions, overall, had a less positive 
view of the country’s direction at T l, and therefore experienced an exaggerated response 
at T2. Overall, it was found that Obama voters experienced outcome-based dissonance, 
where their views of the media were initially biased, but adjust this downward when their 
candidate won the election. McCain voters, on the other hand, experienced no dissonance 
or change in opinion because their initial beliefs were not challenged by the knowledge 
that McCain lost the election.
Finally, there was also a three-way interaction between Time, Vote Choice, and 
Belief Strength for if the country was on the right track (Figure 16). This incorporates the 
findings from the previous two interactions. The first is that McCain supporters with 
Weak beliefs exhibited a linear decrease over time, but those with Strong beliefs did not 
experience significant change across time. On the other hand, Obama supporters both 
showed the same pattern of increase at T2, and subsequently returned to baseline at T3, 
but this pattern of change was much more extreme for Obama supporters with Strong 
beliefs. It might be the case that voters actually liked the McCain-Palin ticket less across 
the time during the election, but it is more likely that the changes seen are caused by 
dissonance surrounding Vote Choice and the election outcome.
This analysis was the one item where Belief Strength may have been a misleading 
variable, because very few individuals had strong and positive prior beliefs about the 
country being on the right track. Therefore, McCain voters with the highest beliefs were
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those who held weak beliefs, and also had the most to correct when the election altered 
the country's direction. Thus, those with the beliefs most opposite to the outcome 
provided by the election, experienced the more extreme version of change. Overall, for 
public opinion items it seemed that voters with Strong Beliefs experienced more extreme 
attitude change, whether the cause be from outcome-based dissonance (Media bias), or 
simply a true change circumstance (Country on right track).
Overall, it seems that for comparative opinions, namely those for the political 
parties and candidates, this study found that those with Weak prior beliefs exhibited 
choice-based dissonance attitude change where the alternatives were spread. In contrast, 
those with Strong beliefs had mixed reactions, with McCain supporters only experienced 
outcome-based dissonance for candidate favorability items. For Electoral fairness, it 
seemed that Vote Choice overrode Belief Strength, and that questions asking about 
fairness for that specific election yielded outcome-based dissonance, whereas those 
concerned with general process fairness only yielded outcome-based dissonance in order 
to repair views of fairness for Obama voters. Furthermore, it might be the case that 
McCain supporters simply could not have adjusted their opinions downward, especially 
with regard to the large win that Obama had over Mccain. Perhaps in closer elections, the 
results would show more outcome-based dissonance for McCain voters. Finally, in 
matters of public opinion, it seemed that Belief Strength altered the degree to which one's 
attitude changes, with those with Strong beliefs having more extreme changes of attitude. 
Limitations and Future Directions
The current study was limited in its generalizability. Firstly, the study could have 
benefitted from a more politically representative sample, which could have been obtained
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outside o f a college-aged population. Secondly, although electoral context is too often 
cited when researchers are attempting to explain differences between election years, in 
this particular case the limitation provided by the electoral context is the reduced 
generalizability of these findings to other election studies. This was particularly the case 
for the anomalous 2008 election, which had higher turnout than usual, included minority 
and female candidates, and a heightened post-election excitement from electing 
America’s first African American President. Although a multi-election study would be 
more generally informative, the findings here are sufficient to demonstrate that an 
individual’s belief strength also plays a role in post-election reactions.
Future directions include using the information gained by understanding how 
Belief Strength played a role in voters’ reactions to the election. One potential avenue of 
explanation lies in the study of affective reactions. For example, voters who are more 
personally invested in the outcome of the election are likely to have stronger emotional 
responses to the outcome. Understanding that prior belief strength plays a role in the 
post-election dissonance is the first step to future research that can attempt to uncover the 
mechanisms through which this phenomenon occurs.
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Table 1
Repeated Measures ANOVA Within-Subjects Main Effects and Interactions fo r Political 
Party and Candidate Favorability Items
Dependent measure Test df F P
Opinion of Republican Party Time x Vote x Strength 2,396 14.31 .00
Opinion of Democratic Party Time x Vote x Strength 2, 396 9.06 .00
Differences Between Parties Time x Strength 2 ,396 11.39 .00
Opinion of McCain-Palin Time 2, 396 18.00 .00
Time x Vote x Strength 2,396 21.49 .00
Opinion of Obama-Biden Time 2, 396 15.84 .00
Time x Vote 2,396 13.74 .00
Time x Vote x Strength 2, 396 41.78 .00
Note. Statistics reported from the Sphericity-Assumed test of Within-Subjects Effects.
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Table 2
Repeated Measures ANOVA Within-Subjects Main Effects and Interactions fo r Electoral 
Fairness and Public Opinion Items
Dependent measure Test df F P
Did Vote Make a Difference Time 2,390 12.83 .00
Timex Vote 2,390 19.02 .00
Electoral System Fairness Time 2,374 4.81 .01
Time x Vote 2,374 4.46 .01
Time x Strength 2,374 3.55 .03
Electoral College Fairness Time 2,392 3.14 .04
Time x Vote 2, 392 4.92 .01
Time x Vote x Strength 2, 392 3.20 .04
Does the Media Bias Public Time 2,388 5.00 .01
Time x Vote 2,388 11.25 .00
Time x Strength 2, 388 12.10 .00
Country on the Right Track Time 2, 390 39.80 .00
Time x Vote 2,390 80.70 .00
Time x Strength 2,390 16.44 .00
Time x Vote x Strength 2, 390 3.77 .02
Note. Statistics reported from the Sphericity-Assumed test of Within-Subjects Effects
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations fo r the Opinion o f Republican Party according to Vote
Choice and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak Tl 4.68 .64 3.78 .87 4.08 .90
T2 5.06 .81 3.48 1.04 4.00 1.22
T3 4.68 1.09 3.43 .98 3.84 1.17
Strong Tl 6.20 .41 1.76 .86 2.88 2.09
T2 5.96 .68 2.26 .92 3.19 1.83
T3 5.84 .85 2.26 .84 3.16 1.78
Total Tl 5.32 .94 2.73 1.33 3.49 1.70
T2 5.44 .88 2.85 1.15 3.60 1.60
T3 5.17 1.15 2.83 1.08 3.51 1.53
Vote choice
Belief strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 34 69 103
Strong (1,2,6,7) 25 74 99
Total N  59 143 202
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for the Opinion o f Democratic Party according to Vote
Choice and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak Tl 3.78 .89 4.32 .80 4.11 .87
T2 3.30 1.24 4.75 1.03 4.19 1.32
T3 3.41 .98 4.80 .98 4.26 1.19
Strong Tl 1.86 1.04 5.92 1.21 5.08 2.03
T2 2.00 .76 5.92 .84 5.10 1.79
T3 2.14 .83 5.77 .90 5.02 1.72
Total Tl 3.07 1.32 5.26 1.32 4.62 1.65
T2 2.81 1.25 5.43 1.08 4.67 1.65
T3 2.93 1.11 5.37 1.05 4.66 1.54
Vote choice
Belief strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 37 59 96
Strong (1,2,6,7) 22 84 106
Total N  59 143 202
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations fo r Differences between the Parties according to Vote
Choice and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak T1 4.33 .68 4.30 .71 4.31 .70
T2 4.79 1.12 4.61 .99 4.67 1.03
T3 4.72 1.03 4.46 1.04 4.54 1.04
Strong T1 6.25 .45 5.57 1.56 5.75 1.40
T2 5.94 1.12 5.34 1.03 5.49 1.08
T3 5.44 1.26 5.21 1.04 5.27 1.10
Total T1 4.85 1.06 4.72 1.22 4.76 1.17
T2 5.10 1.23 4.85 1.06 4.93 1.11
T3 4.92 1.13 4.71 1.10 4.77 1.11
Vote choice
Belief strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 43 96 63
Strong (1,2,6,7) 16 47 139
Total N  59 143 202
Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for the Opinion o f McCain-Palin ticket according
Vote Choice and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak T1 4.63 .72 3.78 .80 4.10 .87
T2 4.97 1.00 3.10 .94 3.81 1.32
T3 4.50 .86 3.00 1.16 3.57 1.28
Strong T1 6.31 .47 1.76 1.3 2.83 2.26
T2 5.69 .89 2.10 1.09 2.94 1.85
T3 5.24 .91 1.80 .93 2.61 1.74
Total T1 5.46 1.04 2.45 1.50 3.33 1.95
T2 5.32 1.01 2.44 1.14 3.28 1.72
T3 4.86 .96 2.21 1.16 2.99 1.64
Vote choice
Belief strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 30 49 79
Strong (1,2,6,7) 29 94 123
Total N  59 143 202
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations fo r the Opinion o f Obama-Biden ticket according to
Vote Choice and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak T1 4.10 .88 4.45 .75 4.31 .82
T2 3.40 1.25 5.53 .93 4.70 1.49
T3 3.60 .77 5.60 .92 4.82 1.30
Strong T1 1.52 .99 6.35 .66 5.23 2.18
T2 2.03 1.02 6.54 .56 5.50 2.03
T3 2.31 1.04 6.46 .63 5.50 1.91
Total T1 2.83 1.60 5.73 1.13 4.88 1.84
T2 2.73 1.32 6.21 .85 5.19 1.88
T3 2.97 1.11 6.17 .84 5.24 1.73
Vote choice
Belief strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 30 47 77
Strong (1,2,6,7) 29 96 125
Total N  59 143 202
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for Did Vote Make a Difference according to Vote
Choice and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak T1 4.15 .69 4.22 .73 4.19 .72
T2 3.59 1.76 4.93 1.61 4.48 1.77
T3 3.02 1.56 4.43 1.55 3.97 1.68
Strong T1 5.00 2.45 4.60 2.35 4.69 2.36
T2 4.06 2.63 5.10 1.99 4.87 2.18
T3 3.53 2.18 4.59 2.00 4.35 2.08
Total T1 4.40 1.47 4.38 1.62 4.38 1.57
T2 3.72 2.04 5.00 1.77 4.63 1.94
T3 3.17 1.76 4.50 1.74 4.11 1.84
Vote choice
Belief strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 41 83 124
Strong (1,2,6,7) 17 58 75
Total N  58 141 199
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations fo r Electoral System Fairness according to Vote Choice
and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak T1 4.29 .69 4.09 .67 4.15 .68
T2 4.24 1.68 4.39 1.20 4.35 1.35
T3 4.63 1.20 4.60 1.04 4.61 1.08
Strong T1 5.89 1.68 3.93 2.29 4.53 2.30
T2 5.17 1.69 3.85 1.73 4.26 1.81
T3 5.33 1.72 4.40 1.60 4.69 1.68
Total T1 4.80 1.33 4.04 1.36 4.27 1.39
T2 4.54 1.73 4.23 1.40 4.32 1.50
T3 4.86 1.41 4.54 1.23 4.63 1.29
Vote choice
Belief strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 38 95 133
Strong (1,2,6,7) 18 40 58
Total N  56 135 191
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for Electoral College Fairness according to Vote Choice
and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak T1 4.03 .70 3.78 .77 3.85 .76
T2 3.61 1.54 3.95 1.20 3.85 1.31
T3 4.19 1.47 4.02 1.32 4.07 1.36
Strong T1 4.91 2.18 2.47 1.87 3.21 1.42
T2 4.82 1.74 3.04 1.66 3.58 1.86
T3 4.68 1.89 3.35 1.87 3.75 1.96
Total T1 4.36 1.50 3.31 1.42 3.62 1.52
T2 4.07 1.70 3.62 1.45 3.75 1.54
T3 4.38 1.64 3.78 1.57 3.95 1.61
Vote choice
Belief strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 36 91 127
Strong (1,2,6,7) 22 51 73
Total N  58 142 200
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Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations for Does the Media Bias the Public according to Vote
Choice and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak T1 4.64 .50 4.52 .54 4.54 5.3
T2 5.27 1.49 4.15 1.36 4.34 1.44
T3 5.27 1.49 4.37 1.22 4.52 1.30
Strong T1 6.65 .48 6.45 .92 6.52 .79
T2 6.42 .99 4.96 1.46 5.49 1.48
T3 6.25 1.19 5.07 1.57 5.50 1.55
Total T1 6.27 .92 5.70 1.23 5.87 1.18
T2 6.20 1.17 4.65 1.47 5.11 1.56
T3 6.07 1.30 4.80 1.48 5.18 1.54
Vote Choice
Belief Strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 11 54 65
Strong (1,2,6,7) 48 85 133
Total N  59 139 198
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Table 12
Means and Standard Deviations for is the Country on the Right Track according to Vote
Choice and Belief Strength
Vote choice
McCain Obama Total
Strength Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Weak T1 3.96 .71 3.62 .66 3.74 .69
T2 2.83 1.31 5.46 1.24 4.53 1.78
T3 2.33 .73 3.85 .65 3.31 1.00
Strong T1 3.43 2.44 1.69 1.16 1.92 1.49
T2 3.00 1.00 5.71 1.14 5.35 1.45
T3 2.57 .79 3.84 .82 3.67 .92
Total T1 3.90 1.04 3.00 1.24 3.27 1.25
T2 2.85 1.27 5.54 1.21 4.74 1.74
T3 2.36 .74 3.85 .71 3.41 .99
Vote Choice
Belief Strength McCain Obama Total N
Weak (3,4,5) 52 95 147
Strong (1,2,6,7) 7 45 52
Total N  59 140 199
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. An interaction between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength for the 
dependent item of the opinion of Republican party.
Figure 2. An interaction between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength for the 
dependent item of the opinion of the Democratic party.
Figure 3. An interaction between Time and Belief Strength for the dependent item of the 
differences between the political parties.
Figure 4. An interaction between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength for the 
dependent item of the opinion of the McCain-Palin ticket.
Figure 5. An interaction between Time and Vote Choice for the dependent item for the 
opinion of the Obama-Biden ticket.
Figure 6. An interaction between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength Opinion of the 
Obama-Biden ticket.
Figure 7. An interaction between Time and Vote Choice for the dependent item of did 
your vote make a difference.
Figure 8. An interaction between Time and Vote Choice for the dependent item of 
fairness in the American electoral system.
Figure 9. An interaction between Time and Belief Strength for the dependent item of 
fairness in the American electoral system.
Figure 10. An interaction between Time and Vote Choice for the dependent item of 
fairness of the Electoral College system over a popular-vote system.
Figure 11. An interaction between Time and Belief Strength for the dependent item of 
fairness of the Electoral College system over a popular-vote system.
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Figure 72. An interaction between Time and Vote Choice for the dependent item of does 
the media bias the American public.
Figure 13. An interaction between Time and Belief Strength for the dependent item of 
does the media bias the American public.
Figure 14. An interaction between Time and Vote Choice for the dependent item of is the 
country on the right track.
Figure 15. An interaction between Time and Belief Strength for the dependent item of is 
the country on the right track.
Figure 16. An interaction between Time, Vote Choice, and Belief Strength for the 
dependent item of is the country on the right track.
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Appendix A.
Note. These questions were presented on a website, and the presentation was slightly 
different to the participant, with drop-down menus and check boxes to mark answers.
Please provide your age________  Please indicate your Sex: Male Female
1. Do you plan to vote in the 2008 election?
Yes No
Not Applicable, I am not 18. Not Applicable, I am not a US citizen.
2. Please indicate where your political beliefs fall on the Left-to-Right continuum, (left is 
associated with liberalism, and right is associated with conservatism):
Strong Left------------------------------------Moderate------------------------------------ Strong Right
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8  9
3. With which party do you identify the most closely?
Republican Democrat Independent Green Libertarian Other
4. When comparing just the Republican and Democratic Parties, how different, do you 
think they are, in what they stand for?
Hardly Any Difference A Fair Amount of Difference A Great Deal of Difference 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. What is your overall opinion of the following, using the following 1-7 scale?
1 = very unfavorable
2 = unfavorable
3 = somewhat unfavorable
4 = neither
5 = somewhat favorable
6 = favorable
7 = very favorable
Republican Party 
Democratic Party
Republican candidates, McCain-Palin 
Democratic candidates, Obama-Biden
6. For which slate of candidates do you
McCain-Palin Obama-Biden
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
plan to support?
Other Undecided
71
7. How decided are you for whom you plan to vote?
Undecided Somewhat Decided Completely Decided
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. How happy do you think you will be if your candidate is elected?
Not at all Somewhat Very Happy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. How upset do you think you will be if your candidate is NOT elected?
Not at all Somewhat Very Upset
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. To what extent do you feel that your vote can make a difference?
Not At All Somewhat Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Do you think that our electoral process is fair in the U. S.?
Not Fair at all Somewhat Fair Very Fair
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. Currently, the electoral college (individuals who vote for president representing their
states), decides who is president, and not the popular vote (the actual number of votes for
the candidates). To what extent do you think this is a fair process?
Not Fair at all Somewhat Fair Very Fair
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Do you think that the media biases the political decisions of the American public?
Not At All Somewhat Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. Do you think the country is on the right track?
Not At All Somewhat Definitely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Broadly speaking, how positive do you think America’s reputation is abroad?
Not At All Somewhat Very
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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16. How likely are you to vote in the upcoming election? 
Not at all likely Probably
1 2 3 4 5 6
Without a Doubt 
7
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Appendix B.
Note. These questions were presented on a website, so the presentation was slightly 
different to the participant, with drop-down menus and check boxes to mark answers.
1. Did you vote in the most recent (2008) presidential election?
 Yes, at my local hometown polling place  Yes, absentee
  Yes, locally in Williamsburg, VA   No, I did not vote
  Not Applicable, I am not 18 _____ Not Applicable, I am not a US citizen
2. When did you vote?
Early On November 4 Did not vote
3. How much money did you donate to you candidate’s campaign?
None Less than $25 $25<$50 $50<$100 +$100
4. Did you participate in any campaign activities for your candidate (i.e. voter 
registration drives)?
Yes No
5. How do you feel about the results of the election?
Click on the circle that best indicates how you feel about the results of the election.
Use the following scale: Not at all A little Some Very
When I think about the results 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
of the election, I feel ...
discouraged 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
contented 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
frustrated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
proud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
energized 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
threatened 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
depressed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
optimistic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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6. Please indicate where your political beliefs fall on the Left-to-Right continuum, (left is 
associated with liberalism, and right is associated with conservatism):
Strong Left------------------------------------ Moderate---------------------------------- Strong Right
1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8  9
7. With which party do you identify the most closely?
Republican Democrat Independent Green Libertarian Other
8. When comparing just the Republican and Democratic Parties, how different, do you 
think they are, in what they stand for?
Hardly Any Difference A Fair Amount of Difference A Great Deal of Difference
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. What is your overall opinion of the following, using the following 1-7 scale?
1 = very unfavorable
2 = unfavorable
3 = somewhat unfavorable
4 = neither
5 = somewhat favorable
6 = favorable
7 = very favorable
Republican Party 1 2 3 4 5
Democratic Party 1 2 3 4 5
Republican candidates, McCain-Palin 1 2 3 4 5
Democratic candidates, Obama-Biden 1 2 3 4 5
10. Which slate of candidates did you support?
McCain-Palin Obama-Biden Other
11. How happy are you that Obama-Biden were elected?
Not at all Somewhat Very Happy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. How upset are you that Obama-Biden were elected?
Not at all Somewhat Very Upset
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. How happy are you that McCain-Palin were NOT elected?
Not at all Somewhat Very Happy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
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14. How upset are you that McCain-Palin were NOT elected?
Not at all Somewhat Very Upset
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. To what extent did you feel that your vote could have or made a difference?
Not At All Somewhat Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. Do you think that our electoral process is fair in the U. S.?
Not Fair at all Somewhat Fair Very Fair
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Currently, the electoral college (individuals who vote for president representing their 
states), decides who is president, and not the popular vote (the actual number of votes for 
the candidates). To what extent do you think this is a fair process?
Not Fair at all Somewhat Fair Very Fair
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Do you think that the media biased the political decisions of the American public?
Not At All Somewhat Very Much
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Given the election results, do you think that the country will be on the right track 
once the new administration takes over?
Not At All Somewhat Definitely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. How important is it to you, that America’s reputation abroad is positive?
Not At All Somewhat Very Important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Broadly speaking, how positive do you think America’s reputation is abroad?
Not At All Somewhat Very
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. How likely are you to vote in the next presidential election- 2012?
Not at all likely Probably Without a Doubt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
